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REPLY BRIEF OF ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE OF
MT. OLYMPUS COVE SUBDIVISION NO. 3
On May 18, Plaintiff-Appellant Architectural Committee of the Mt.
Olympus Cove Subdivision No. 3 ("the Architectural Committee" or "the
Committee") filed its Initial Brief in this proceeding.

On June 24, 1997,

Defendant-Appellee Amy E. Kabatznick filed her responsive brief ("Kabatznick Brief').1

The Architectural Committee respectfully submits its Reply

Brief in response to the Kabatznick Brief.
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A.

KABATZNICK HAS IMPROPERLY ARGUED THE MERITS OF THE
CASE WITH ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE
RECORD AND WOULD BE DISPUTED AT TRIAL

Kabatznick's brief deals extensively in allegations and claims of factual
matters that are not part of the record in this case. (E.g., Kabatznick Brief at
5-8, 29) The Architectural Committee believes this is improper and contests
these extra-record matters in two ways: (1) Kabatzmck's claim that the recitations on pages 5-8 of her brief have been "admitted" by the Committee is
simply wrong. Kabatznick has, in a variety of pleadings, attempted to argue
factual matters that have never been submitted as evidence nor become a part
J

The original filing date for Kabatzmck's brief was June 18, 1997. The
Architectural Committee had stipulated to Kabatzmck's request for a 30-day
extension (to July 17), but Kabatzmck's brief was still filed seven days out of
time. Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 26(c), the Architectural
Committee is filing a motion concerning the out-of-time filing under separate
cover.

of the record in the case. (2) The Committee contends that many of Kabatznick's "factual" claims and characterizations are simply false, and they would
be refuted at trial. However, this Court is not the forum to argue evidentiary
matters that have never been adjudicated by the trial court. Except to make a
brief summary statement to contest the primary non-record fact claims of
Kabatznick, the Committee will not undertake a point-by-point rebuttal of these
various extra-record evidentiary matters.
Kabatznick's claim that her motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds
is in the nature of a motion for summary judgment is a construction that, quite
simply, has no basis in law or fact. Therefore, the tortured conclusion that the
arguments of counsel in various pleadings before the trial court have been
"admitted" is totally groundless. It cannot be disputed that no direct evidence
was ever taken by the trial court; that the only affidavit-based evidence was
submitted by the Committee in its July 9, 1996, filing in response to Kabatznick's motion to dismiss [R. 394-96]; that no Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment was ever filed; and that the only pleading that has brought us all
before this Court was a straightforward motion to dismiss based on a claim of
no standing to sue. Further, it is not insignificant that Kabatznick's Statement
of Facts section is primarily supported by reference to various depositions that
are not part of the record on appeal.
Nothing here permits Kabatznick's peculiar conclusion that she is entitled to deem her unilateral, pleadings-based claims and statements of counsel as
-2-

"undisputed based on deposition transcripts cited/ nor that "[s]uch factual
matters were presented to the trial court with no objection or dispute by the
parties." (Kabatznick Brief at 4-5.) The position is a patent misrepresentation
of the state of the record, and various "factual" claims relied on by Kabatznick
as undisputed have not seen the light of a factual adjudication.2 To the extent
Kabatznick relies on them in her Brief, the conclusions drawn from them are,
at best, not justified nor reliable.
B.

THE COMMITTEE'S CITATION TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17(a) Is PROPER ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT PERMITTING AN
AMENDMENT TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

Kabatznick argues that the Committee may not cite Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 17(a) for the first time in its Initial Brief to this Court in support of
its position that the trial court should not have rejected both amended complaints in the proceeding.
The general rule that parties may not raise an issue for the first time on
appeal has no application here. In the first place, the argument that is at stake
here is whether the Committee property owners are legally entitled to amend
the original complaint with relation back to June 13, 1995. The principle that

2

The recitation in the numbered paragraphs on pages 5-8 and the paragraph at
the bottom of page 29 of Kabatznick's Brief are not only taken largely from
materials outside die record, they contain claims and conclusions with which the
Committee vigorously disagrees. For example, claims in paragraph 9 on page 7
that the Committee "remained completely silent and failed utterly to notify her"
are, at best, flagrant distortions of what actually took place; but, in all events,
these are not factual matters that are currently before this Court.
-3-

an issue or argument may not be raised for the first time on appeal should no
more preclude the Committee from citing Rule 17(a) in support of its position
than it would prevent it from citing a supporting judicial decision for the first
time on appeal.
The only case cited by Kabatznick, Ong International (U.S.A.) Inc. v.
Ilth Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993), involved a full trial on the
merits, and the defendant attempted to raise on appeal the basic issue of when
claims arose relative to a statute's effective date.

Here, the case never got

beyond a procedural dismissal of the original and amended complaints. Ong
does not apply. The principle that prohibits raising issues for the first time on
appeal does not preclude a party from citing supporting law for the first time
on appeal. The citation to Rule 17(a) is merely ancillary support to the basic
procedures provided under Rule 15; the citation to Rule 17(a) doesn't raise a
new issue or argument.
The Committee has, by the nature of the amendment process itself,
properly raised the amendment issues with the trial court: The Committee's
first amended complaint was a direct response to an order of the trial court and
was not, therefore, accompanied by any memorandum or argument. [R. 34360] The second amended complaint and supporting memorandum [R. 478-96]
were in response to what the Committee believed was an improper dismissal of
the first amendment.

The very acts of seeking to amend the original com-

plaints properly raised this as an issue and do not preclude the citation of Rule
-4-

17(a) as support for the first time on appeal.
Equally as fundamentally, the dispositive procedural nature of the issue
did not provide any reasonable opportunity to raise the Rule 17(a) argument
with the trial court.

Because that court simply dismissed the attempts to

amend, an appeal under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 is the first opportunity for the Committee to seek redress. In raising this issue as grounds to
dismiss the appeal, Kabatznick does not explain when the Committee and the
individual property owners were supposed to raise the argument prior to filing
an appeal.3 In contrast to Ong, where the issue that the Court refused to hear
on appeal was early in a full trial, the first action by the trial court to which
the Committee could react and raise any argument or objection was the final,
appealable order issued on November 18, 1996.
Accordingly, the citation to Rule 17(a) was properly included in the
Committee's Initial Brief.
II. RESPONSE TO KABATZNICK'S MAIN ARGUMENTS
A.

ABSENCE OF A STATUTE OR RULE OR SPECIFIC COVENANT PROVISION DOES NOT FORECLOSE THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE
FROM BRINGING AN ACTION TO ENFORCE SUBDIVISION COVENANTS.

Kabatznick's Argument A states as follows: "Standing requires a proper
3

Recall that the first amended complaint was an attempt to comply with the
trial court's order. It was not a procedure initiated by the Committee, and the
Committee's response to the dismissal was naturally oriented around the apparent
basis for the judge's actions—not why the judge should permit an amendment
generated in the first instance by the Committee.
-5-

plaintiff that exists as a legal entity entitled to sue in its common name by
statute or court rule and plaintiff fails these requirements . . . ."
Kabatznick's Brief cites no direct authority for this conclusion.

The

Committee believes that this is not the state of the law in Utah. That is, the
aggregate of Utah statutes and court rules that provide directly the right to
bring actions are not exclusive and do not delineate every entity or situation
that may give rise to a cognizable action. That is not the nature of commonlaw American jurisprudence.4
Simple counter-examples to Kabatznick's assertion are found in situations in which third-party beneficiaries are entitled to bring actions in their own
names.5 In most states—and in Utah, in particular—statutes do not explicitly
grant third-party beneficiaries the right to bring actions to enforce contracts.
Yet, there is a common-law right of action under certain circumstances.6
Under Kabatznick's "rule," the Utah Restaurant Association would
never have made it out of the starting gate to bring a successful action against
the Davis County Board of Health. In Utah Restaurant Ass 'n v. Davis County
Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court concluded that, for certain types of actions, an association of businesses could

A

See, e.g., 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties §§ 1-2 (1987).

5

See, e.g., 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 435-439 (1991).

Hd.
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bring an action to obtain relief for its constituent members. Yet, there appears
to be no statute or rule that specifically grants the right to sue to such associations. Kabatznick's theory would dictate that the Utah Supreme Court simply
had no ability to permit the Utah Restaurant Association to proceed as a plaintiff.
Kabatznick cites the case of Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson,
9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959), to support her contention. But the
more recent case of Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988),
arrived at a contrary result—one that disproves Kabatznick's general theory.
In Cottonwood, the Supreme Court concluded that then-Rule 17(d)'s7 omission
of the right to sue for joint ventures did not preclude the joint venture from
suing in its own name. This, then, is an example of an entity that was deemed
to have the right to sue, despite the absence of a specific statute or rule that
granted it.
The other cases cited in Kabatznick's Argument A do not shed any particular light on this case, because they deal with situations where there is a
statute that controls.8 Indeed, Kabatznick concedes that the Utah courts have
7

Rule 17(d) has since been amended to incorporate the holding in Cottonwood
by adding an explicit right to sue for certain business associations.
8

In that regard, the portion of Kabatznick's Brief that discusses Rule 17(d)
attacks a straw man. The Committee did not cite Rule 17(d) in its Initial Brief
and has not relied on it. To the extent that Rule 17(d) contemplates certain business operations as its foundation, the Committee concedes that it may not satisfy
(continued...)
-7-

not addressed the standing issue in a case where a management committee
created by restricted covenants has attempted to bring an action on behalf of lot
owners to enforce their right to injunctive relief. (Kabatznick Brief at 22.)
Accordingly, it is appropriate for this Court to address the matter by applying
the analysis of a foundational case decided by the Supreme Court in which the
standing of an association of common members was considered—namely, the
Utah Restaurant case, which is discussed in more detail in the Committee's
Initial Brief (at pages 9-14) and under § II.C of this Reply Brief.
B.

THE SUBDIVISION PROPERTY OWNERS' INTERESTS ARE HELD
SUBJECT TO THE COVENANTS' PROVISIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS TO
DELEGATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARCHITECTURAL STANDARDS TO
THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE.

Argument B of Kabatznick's Brief correctly notes that restrictive covenants comprise burdens and benefits that run with the land. It also correctly
notes that individual property owners have standing to bring actions to enforce
covenants that burden or benefit the underlying property.

However, it is

incorrect for Kabatznick to leap from these principles to the unwarranted
conclusion that only individual property owners may bring an action of the type
8

(... continued)
such a requirement. But, contrary to Kabatznick's pejorative representation that
the Committee is "a purported committee of a few persons claiming to be a genuine association," an allegation for which there was no evidence on the record
before the trail court nor before this Court, the Committee is exactly what the
Restrictive Covenants provided for: a designated individual or individuals who
"have full authority to approve or disapprove [the] design and location" of new or
altered buildings under the standard of "conformity and harmony of external
design with the existing structures in the development." [R. 9]
-8-

now before this Court.
Article I of the Subdivision's Restrictive Covenants provides for an
architectural standard and then delegates an organization to implement the
standards—the Architectural Committee.

All property owners, including

Kabatznick, have taken their property with the attached benefits (or burdens,
from Kabatznick's point of view), including this delegation of responsibility to
the Architectural Committee. This is a direct application of the running-withthe-land principle cited in Argument B of Kabatznick's Brief (at pages 17-21).
That is, when Kabatznick purchased Lot 28, she not only bought the ground
and the building on it, she bought the architectural constraints and the delegation to the Architectural Committee of responsibility to implement those constraints.
Kabatznick's Brief (at pages 19-20) ascribes an almost pointless, vacuous
function to the Committee—merely to receive and review architectural plans
for conformity to the Covenant's standards and nothing more.

Under this

construction, the Committee's role would be a near nullity. Yet, contracts and
other legal documents are to be construed to be rational and reasonable if
possible.9 Kabatznick's strained, artificial construction would require individ9

See, e.g., G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (interpretation of contract to give objective and reasonable construction to
the contract as a whole, and to give effect to all of its terms if possible); First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1983) (as
between conflicting interpretations, preference for equitable result over a harsh
(continued...)
-9-

ual Committee members—and perhaps others—to undertake separate action
and the accompanying individual burdens.

This is not consistent with the

responsibilities assigned to the Committee by the Covenants and is exactly the
type of situation that the Utah Supreme Court addressed in Utah Restaurant in
finding that justice was not well-served by requiring associated individuals to
pursue a common grievance as separate parties. Denying the Committee, as
decision-maker under the Covenants, the authority to take action concerning
Covenant non-compliance is not a rational interpretation of Article I of the
Covenants and should be rejected by the Court.
The Covenants do run with the land; they were intended to maintain
certain standards and to provide a mechanism for implementation. Kabatznick
and all other property owners are accordingly bound by the delegation of
authority to the Committee that is incorporated in those Covenants.
As anticipated in the Committee's Initial Brief (at pages 12-14), Kabatznick takes the position that the absence of a provision in the Subdivision's
Covenants explicitly granting the Committee the ability to file a lawsuit should
dispose of the standing question. The Committee won't repeat its Initial Brief
arguments, but will only add the observation that, contrary to the reading that

9

(... continued)
and inequitable result); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 291 P.2d 890,
893 (Utah 1955) ("rational and just" construction of contracts).
-10-

Kabatznick wants to put on it, Article XIV10 of the Covenants does not read
"it shall be lawful only for any other person or persons owning property
situated in said tract to prosecute any proceedings at law or in equity." And,
as pointed out in the Committee's Initial Brief (at 13, n.8), it's not even clear
that such language could foreclose other parties with bona fide interests to
protect by enforcing the Covenants.
G.

THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK OF UTAH RESTAURANT ASS'N AND
WARTH V. SELDIN IS APPLICABLE TO ESTABLISH THE STANDING OF
THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE TO PURSUE RELIEF THAT IS
COMMON TO THE SUBDIVISION OWNERS.

Kabatznick's Argument C appears to be founded on the theory that there
must be a "statute or rule" that permits the Committee to bring what Kabatznick has described as "an action in representative capacity," as though the term
"representative capacity" will defeat the Committee's position.

First, the

Committee's existence is a direct creation of the Covenant and has been given
responsibilities that it seeks to carry out directly by bringing this action. It
proceeds in "representative capacity" only to the extent that the Covenants so
contemplated by forming such a group to obtain appropriate results for its
constituency. There is nothing sinister or out-of-the-ordinary about it.
More importantly, perhaps, Kabatznick's statute-or-rule approach is not
the foundation of the analysis that the Utah Restaurant Ass'n case undertook.

"See Committee Initial Brief, at 13 n.7, for the explanation of a minor numbering discrepancy.
-11-

Rather, in that case, the Utah Supreme Court considered fundamentals of
judicial efficiency and fairness to conclude that, for certain actions in which the
individual members of an association played no particular individual role, but
who sought a common remedy or outcome, an artificial barrier to pursuit of
such a remedy should not be thrown up to require only individuals to pursue
the action. In that connection, the Supreme Court did not enter into an analysis of whether there is a "statute or rule" that permitted the Utah Restaurant
Association to maintain an action.
Still, Kabatznick focuses on statutes and rules as though they are the
only source of the right to bring an action seeking equitable relief. The Committee does not dispute that there is no statute, court rule or Utah case precedent that provides: "Architectural committees of Utah subdivisions are authorized to sue and be sued in the courts of Utah."

Nor, does the Committee

contest the observation that the Restrictive Covenants of the Subdivision do not
expressly recite similar words. But the negative inference that, in the absence
of such provisions, the Committee has no standing is logically and legally
unsupportable, as discussed in § II.B of this Reply Brief.
The Committee's Initial Brief also treats this point on pages 12-13,
noting that common-law rights to bring actions may exist in addition or as
complements to statutory rights to sue. Kabatznick's references to condominium cases such as Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P. 2d 342 (Utah 1978), are quite
irrelevant to this case. Rather, the relevant analysis is contained in the Utah
-12-

Restaurant case.
Kabatznick attempts to distinguish Utah Restaurant by noting that the
Utah Restaurant Association was incorporated, while the Committee is not.
Although there is such a factual difference, Justice Zimmerman's analysis and
the Court's opinion do not at any point invoke this fact in concluding the
association had standing. Indeed, the Utah Restaurant analysis, as well as that
in the Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975), case, provides a publicpolicy foundation that applies directly to any formalized association, whether
incorporated or not. Parts of the reasoning bears repeating:
Where, as a practical matter, the rights asserted and the remedies
sought do not require direct participation by affected individuals
who would have standing, there is no reason not to permit associations to press claims common to their members. This approach
to standing has the advantage of permitting the prosecution of
legitimate claims by an entity with the capacity to spread the costs
of litigation among its members and to assume the burdens incident to it, rather than requiring a single litigant to carry the entire
load.
709 P.2d at 1163. And further:
To deny an association standing under such circumstances just
might deter the assertion of valid claims without serving any
countervailing purpose. We decline to take such a sterile approach to standing and adopt the [Warth] test above for determining an association's standing to sue.
Id.
Although it is never explicitly raised, the following implication is found
in Kabatznick's Brief:

Some (a minority) of the Committee do not directly

possess property interests in the Subdivision; therefore, the Committee contains
-13-

" strangers" to the Subdivision, preventing it from maintaining an action. It is
undisputed that three of the members are property owners; a fourth has an
indirect interest as the trustee of a family trust that holds property; and the
other three are resident-spouses of property owners. All are current members
of the Committee, and all have an interest in the benefits conferred by the Restrictive Covenants—either as owners or perhaps as third-party beneficiaries.11

Thus, although the Covenants do not require the Committee to com-

prise only Subdivision property owners or residents, all*members of the Committee do have a real interest in the enforcement of the Covenants, and Utah
Restaurant applies directly.12
To distract attention from the real interest that Subdivision owners and
residents have in enforcing the Covenants, Kabatznick tries to convince the
Court that the Restrictive Covenants are, in some way, unrelated to the current
property owners: "Covenant I [dealing with the Committee and the architectural standards] was plainly for the benefit for of the developer and the protection
of his resale value and not for the benefit of the individual residents." (Kabatznick Brief at 24) This is a fictional construct, entirely unsupported by anything
in the record, anything outside the record, and contrary to the general recognin

See, e.g., 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 435-439 (1991), discussing situations in which persons without privity of contract may, nevertheless, bring an
action on their own behalf.
12

Kabatznick's Brief never addresses the basic policy foundation in Utah Restaurant to show why the conditions in that and the Warth cases do not apply here.
-14-

tion of the validity of real-property restrictive covenants.13 Kabatznick's argument in this regard is totally inconsistent with her Argument B, which (not
improperly) observes that the Covenants run with the land. Indeed, if they run
with the land, then successive holders of property interests in the Subdivision
take with the burdens and benefits of the Covenants, one of which is that there
is an ongoing mechanism to protect them from the invasion of a new property
owner who might erect a radical structure that is not in "conformity and harmony of external design with existing structures in the development."

The

allegation that this covenant is solely for the benefit of the original developer
and does not serve as a benefit that attached to the current property owners
themselves incorrectly states the legal effect of Article I of the Covenants.
D.

RULE 17(a), SUPPORTING CASE LAW, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FAVORING THE ADJUDICATION OF CASES ON THE MERITS, AND THE
FACTS IN THIS CASE REQUIRE LEAVE TO AMEND THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT IF THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE IS FOUND NOT
TO BE THE PROPER PARTY.

Argument D of Kabatznick's Brief appears to argue that Rules 15(a) and
15(c) do not apply to this case because "there is no identity of interest between
the Committee and the lot owners."

(Kabatznick Brief at 32.)

This claim

misconstrues the phrase "identity of interest" by equating it to "identity of parties." The analysis is not on the parties, but on the interests of the parties and
n

See, e.g., Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155, 162 (Utah 1967).
Kabatznick cites this case for the irrelevant point that, if the Architectural Committee ceased to function, individuals would still have a right of action to enforce
the covenants—a point the Committee does not dispute.
-15-

how the case would unfold were the case to go forward with the amended
parties. In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah
1984), a case cited by Kabatznick, an amendment failed because the interest of
a new party (the manufacturer of an allegedly defective door) was not the same
as the interest of the original defendant (the supplier of the door). It is fairly
clear that a case with such separate entities in the chain from the manufacturer
to the ultimate consumer differs fundamentally from the factual circumstances
before the Court, in which the individuals are a subset of the originally named
plaintiff—an organization created and delegated to protect certain property
interests for those individuals.
Kabatznick cites Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah
1976), for the proposition that Rule 15(c) does not generally apply to the
addition or substitution of new parties. But her Brief does not go on to cite the
applicable part of the case: "The exception [to this rule] operates where there
is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties
have an identify of interest; so it can be assumed or proved that relation back
is not prejudicial." Id. at 906.
If there were ever a case of identity of interest for purposes of Rule
15(a), this must be it. Absolutely no aspect of the case changed when the formal amendments were submitted:

facts, circumstances, relevant witnesses,

remedy, discovery—they would all have been the same. The upshot is that the
Committee and the individual property owners do have the requisite identity of
-16-

interest contemplated by Rule 15 and the interpretative case law.
The basic application of Rule 15(a) should focus on the language itself:
"[L]eave shall freely be given [to amend] when justice so requires." (Emphasis
added.) The Committee and the individuals who have (conditionally) sought to
be joined or substituted believe that the current case presents exactly the type
of situation contemplated by this language.14
"Justice" in this case should recognize that the Subdivision's Restrictive
Covenants provided an explicit architectural standard to be administered by the
Architectural Committee and that the Committee has proceeded in a straightforward fashion under that delegation. It has attempted to carry out its duties
to implement the requirement of those Covenants in the face of an owner who
(1) has conceded that she did not seek Committee approval pursuant to the
Covenants until she was some way along with her reconstruction, (2) did not
submit the plans for the structure until the Committee had reminded her of her
obligations under the Covenants, (3) ignored the Committee's finding that the
plans did not comply with the Covenants, and (4) is proceeding with construction.
These facts and the law surrounding the substantive dispute were fully

"See generally 3 Moore's Federal Practice §§ 15.15, 15.16[1], 15.19[2],
15.19[3] (3d ed. 1997) for a variety of situations in which the basic approach to
Rule 15 is to grant the right to amend when the facts and circumstances are not
materially different from the original pleading and there is no prejudice to the
parties.
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developed through discovery and pre-trial preparation, and trial was only days
away before the current procedural issue was raised and proceeded to the
current stage of the case.
To the extent that the Committee is deemed unable to proceed without
joinder or substitution of one or more Subdivision property owners, it would
be a palpable injustice to deny the plaintiffs the ability to amend under Rules
15(a) and 17(a) and to attach the relation-back provision of Rule 15(c) to it.
As the Committee and individuals have previously stated [R. 343; 382, % 12],
the amended complaint (in either form) involves the identical set of facts and
circumstances relative to the original pleading; it raises no new issues; it pleads
no different or additional facts;15 it seeks no different remedy; and—perhaps
most conclusively—it causes no prejudice to the defendant in responding to the
issues raised and remedies sought on June 13, 1995.
Kabatznick has been on notice of the full definition of the dispute, the
relevant facts and circumstances, and the remedy sought by the Committee
since "day one." The factual presentations at trial, the legal arguments and the
relevant considerations to allow a tribunal to reach a decision on the merits
would not have changed one whit by the joinder or substitution of individual
lot owners.

Reason:

The actions complained of and the relief sought goes

only to the Kabatznick structure and does not involve in any individual way the

15

Except as necessary to identify the individual property owners.
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property owners in the Subdivision.16
Under the theme of Rule 15, justice requires that aggrieved homeowners
of the Subdivision be heard, that the merits of their case be put before the trial
court, and that the case go forward as of the time of the filing of the original
complaint. Although it did not center around Rule 15, the basic analysis of
Utah Restaurant is applicable here as well: "Where, as a practical matter, the
rights asserted and the remedies sought do not require direct participation by
affected individuals who would have standing, there is no reason not to permit
associations to press claims common to their members." Utah Restaurant, 709
P.2d at 1103. Read in connection with Rule 15, the only fair conclusion to
reach is that any formal amendment necessary to the case should proceed under
the relation-back provision of Rule 15(c).
Finally, in the context of Rule 17(a), Kabatznick raises the case of
Estate of Haro v. Haw, 887 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1994),17 to defeat any
amendment by joinder of substitution. In Haro, there was a fundamental error
in the original complaint's specification of a plaintiff whom the Legislature
had, in effect, found to be an inappropriate potential beneficiary in a wrongfuldeath action.

Citing the observation that "the purpose of the statute is 'to

16

Another way to see this is to ask whether the development of the lawsuit and
its ultimate resolution would change in any material way if some otiier set of
individual property owners who were to be joined/substituted. The answer is
clearly "no."
17

Kabatznick's Brief cites to 880 P.2d.
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provide compensation to those who were dependent on the decedent'," a panel
of this Court found that the Legislature had specifically limited the possible
benefits of a wrongful-death action to the heirs of the decedent, and that the
decedent's estate was not entitled to any such benefits.
In the case now before the Court, the individual property owners and the
Committee of which they are members are directly and inherently connected
with the same interests in the case. This identity of interest, which was discussed above, satisfies all of the elements of notice pleading: the defendant
has been on notice from the very beginning what the elements of the dispute
were all about and who was on the other side of the contest. Should the Committee not have the requisite standing, a technical misdesignation of the Committee made up of individuals, most (if not all) of whom may bring the same
action should not produce the inequitably harsh result of forcing the suit to
begin anew. These considerations contrast with the distinctly separate interests
of the estate of Haro vis-a-vis the heirs of Haro—fundamentally different
entities in the eyes of the wrongful-death statute.
III. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of cases and theories put forward in the
Kabatznick Brief, this case can best be viewed with the question of "what's the
fair, equitable and just result?" In consideration only of the undisputed elements of this case, Kabatznick: purchased property in the Subdivision; methodically demolished nearly all of the existing structure on the lot; began
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construction of an entirely new building without complying with the Restrictive
Covenants that require approval of the plans by the Architectural Committee;
and ignored the Committee's disapproval of her plans when she submitted
them.
Without pleading the case on factual elements that might be at issue
before the trial court,18 the Committee believes that the law—in particular, the
analyses and policy considerations in Utah Restaurant and Warth—and the
underlying equities require this dispute to be disposed of on the merits, as the
facts and circumstances existed on June 13, 1995, the date the original complaint was filed.
WHEREFORE,

the Architectural Committee of the Mount Olympus Cove

Subdivision No. 3 respectfully requests that this Court enter its order finding
the Architectural Committee had, and has, standing to bring this lawsuit against
Appellee Kabatznick and remanding the case to the Third District Court with
instructions to reinstate the action originally filed on June 13, 1995.
In the alternative, if the Architectural Committee did not have standing
to bring suit, the Architectural Committee and its three member-property

18

Such as the sequence of events leading to the current composition of the
Committee; whether the Committee had a responsibility to contact Kabatznick
earlier in her project about the necessity for complying with the covenants; or
whether the Committee's rejection of the plans when they were submitted was
within the bounds of its discretion. These all contain possible factual elements
that Kabatznick could properly raise at trial, but which play no role in the legal
issues currently before this Court.
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owners, Robert B. Wray, James. B. Streisand and Joyce K. Ridd, seek an
order of this Court (a) finding that the trial court unlawfully dismissed (or
denied a motion to file) amended complaints seeking to join three Subdivision
property owners of record, (b) remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to proceed pursuant to one of the two amended complaints, and (c)
declaring that any such amended complaint relates back to the original June 13,
1995, complaint under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a).
Dated this 23d day of July 1997.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

Glen D. Watkins
Andrew H. Stone
Attorneys for Architectural Committee
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